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Complexity of comparison of influence of players in simple games
Haris Aziz
Abstract
Coalitional voting games appear in different forms in multi-agent systems, social choice
and threshold logic. In this paper, the complexity of comparison of influence between players
in coalitional voting games is characterized. The possible representations of simple games
considered are simple games represented by winning coalitions, minimal winning coalitions,
weighted voting game or a multiple weighted voting game. The influence of players is gauged
from the viewpoint of basic player types, desirability relations and classical power indices such as
Shapley-Shubik index, Banzhaf index, Holler index, Deegan-Packel index and Chow parameters.
Among other results, it is shown that for a simple game represented by minimal winning
coalitions, although it is easy to verify whether a player has zero or one voting power, computing
the Banzhaf value of the player is #P-complete. Moreover, it is proved that multiple weighted
voting games are the only representations for which it is NP-hard to verify whether the game
is linear or not. For a simple game with a set Wm of minimal winning coalitions and n players,
a O(n.|Wm|+n2log(n)) algorithm is presented which returns ‘no’ if the game is non-linear and
returns the strict desirability ordering otherwise. The complexity of transforming simple games
into compact representations is also examined.
1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
Simple games are yes/no coalitional voting games which arise in various mathematical contexts.
Simple games were first analysed by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in their mon-
umental book Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour [25]. They also examined weighted
voting games in which voters have corresponding voting weights and a coalition of voters wins if
their total weights equal or exceed a specified quota. Neumann and Morgenstern [25] observe that
minimal winning coalitions are a useful way to represent simple games. A similar approach has
been taken in [11]. We examine the complexity of computing the influence of players in simple
games represented by winning coalitions, minimal winning coalitions, weighted voting games and
multiple weighted voting games.
1.2 Outline
In Section 2, we outline different representations and properties of simple games. In Section 3,
compact representations of simple games are considered. After that, the complexity of computing
the influence of players in simple games is considered from the point of view of player types (Section
4), desirability ordering (Section 5), power indices and Chow parameters (Section 6). The final
Section includes a summary of results and some open problems.
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2 Background
2.1 Definitions
Definitions 2.1. A simple voting game is a pair (N, v) with v : 2N → {0, 1} where v(∅) = 0,
v(N) = 1 and v(S) ≤ v(T ) whenever S ⊆ T . A coalition S ⊆ N is winning if v(S) = 1 and
losing if v(S) = 0. A simple voting game can alternatively be defined as (N,W ) where W is the
set of winning coalitions. This is called the extensive winning form. A minimal winning coalition
(MWC) of a simple game v is a winning coalition in which defection of any player makes the
coalition losing. A set of minimal winning coalitions of a simple game v can be denoted byWm(v).
A simple voting game can be defined as (N,Wm). This is called the extensive minimal winning
form.
For the sake of brevity, we will abuse the notation to sometimes refer to game (N, v) as v.
Lemma 2.2. For a simple game (N,W ), Wm can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. For any S ∈W , remove elements from S until any further removals would make the coalition
losing. The resultant coalition S′ is a member of Wm.
Definition 2.3. A coalition S is blocking if its complement (N \ S) is losing. For a simple game
G = (N,W ), there is a dual game Gd = (N,W d) where W d contains all the blocking coalitions in
G.
Definitions 2.4. The simple voting game (N, v) where
W = {X ⊆ N,
∑
x∈X wx ≥ q} is called a weighted voting game(WVG). A weighted voting game is
denoted by [q;w1, w2, ..., wn] where wi is the voting weight of player i. Usually, wi ≥ wj if i < j.
Definitions 2.5. An m-multiple weighted voting game (MWVG) is the simple game (N, v1∧· · ·∧
vm) where the games (N, vt) are the WVGs [q
t;wt1, . . . , w
t
n] for 1 ≤ t ≤ m. Then v = v1 ∧ · · · ∧ vm
is defined as:
v(S) =
{
1, if vt(S) = 1, ∀t, 1 ≤ t ≤ m.
0, otherwise.
The dimension of (N, v) is the least k such that there exist WMGs (N, v1), . . . , (N, vk) such that
(N, v) = (N, v1) ∧ . . . ∧ (N, vk).
Definitions 2.6. A WVG [q;w1, . . . , wn] is homogeneous if w(S) = q for all S ∈ W
m. A simple
game (N, v) is homogeneous if it can be represented by a homogeneous WVG. A simple game
(N, v) is symmetric if v(S) = 1, T ⊂ N and |S| = |T | implies v(T ) = 1.
It is easy to see that symmetric games are homogeneous with a WVG representation of [k; 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
].
That is the reason they are also called k-out-of-n simple games.
Banzhaf index [2] and Shapley-Shubik index [23] are two classic and popular indices to gauge the
voting power of players in a simple game. They are used in the context of weighted voting games,
but their general definition makes them applicable to any simple game.
Definition 2.7. A player i is critical in a coalition S when S ∈W and S \ i /∈W . For each i ∈ N ,
we denote the number of coalitions in which i is critical in game v by the Banzhaf value ηi(v).
The Banzhaf Index of player i in weighted voting game v is βi =
ηi(v)P
i∈Nηi(v)
.
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Definitions 2.8. The Shapley-Shubik value is the function κ that assigns to any simple game
(N, v) and any voter i a value κi(v) where κi =
∑
X⊆N (|X| − 1)!(n − |X|)!(v(X) − v(X − {i})).
The Shapley-Shubik index of i is the function φ defined by φi =
κi
n!
Definition 2.9. ([8]) For a simple game v, Chow parameters, CHOW(v) are (|W1|, . . . |Wn|; |W |)
where Wi = {S : S ⊆ N, i ∈ S}.
2.2 Desirability relation and linear games
The individual desirability relations between players in a simple game date back at least to Maschler
and Peleg [18].
Definitions 2.10. In a simple game (N, v),
• A player i ismore desirable/influential than player j (i D j) if v(S∪{j}) = 1⇒ v(S∪{i}) =
1 for all S ⊆ N \ {i, j}.
• Players i and j are equally desirable/influential or symmetric (i ∼D j) if v(S ∪ {j}) = 1 ⇔
v(S ∪ {i}) = 1 for all S ⊆ N \ {i, j}.
• A player i is strictly more desirable/influential than player j (i ≻D j) if i is more desirable
than j, but if i and j are not equally desirable.
• A player i and j are incomparable if there exist S, T ⊆ N \ {i, j} such that v(S ∪ {i}) = 1,
v(S ∪ {j}) = 0, v(T ∪ {i}) = 0 and v(T ∪ {j}) = 1.
Linear simple games are a natural class of simple games:
Definitions 2.11. A simple game is linear whenever the desirability relation D is complete that
is any two players i and j are comparable (i ≻ j, j ≻ i or i ∼ j).
For linear games, the relation R∼ divides the set of voters N into equivalence classes N/R∼ =
{N1, . . . , Nt} such that for any i ∈ Np and j ∈ Nq, i ≻ j if and only if p < q.
Definitions 2.12. A simple game v is swap robust if an exchange of two players from two winning
coalitions cannot render both losing. A simple game is trade robust if any arbitrary redistributions
of players in a set of winning coalitions does not result in all coalitions becoming losing.
It is easy to see that trade robustness implies swap robustness. Taylor and Zwicker [24] proved
that a simple game can be represented by a WVG if and only if it is trade robust. Moreover they
proved that a simple game being linear is equivalent to it being swap robust.
Taylor and Zwicker [24] show in Proposition 3.2.6 that v is linear if and only if ≻D is acyclic
which is equivalent to ≻D being transitive. This is not guaranteed in other desirability relations
defined over coalitions [9].
Proposition 2.13. A simple game with three or fewer players is linear.
Proof. For a game to be non-linear, we want to player 1 and 2 to be incomparable, i.e., there exist
coalitions S1, S2 ⊆ N \ {1, 2} such that v({1} ∪ S1) = 1, v({2} ∪ S1) = 0, v({1} ∪ S2) = 0 and
v({2} ∪ S2) = 1. This is clearly not possible for n = 1 or 2. For n = 3, without loss of generality,
v is non-linear only if v({1} ∪ ∅) = 1, v({2} ∪ ∅) = 0, v({1} ∪ {3}) = 0 and v({2} ∪ {3}) = 1.
However the fact that v({1} ∪ ∅) = 1 and v({1} ∪ {3}) = 0 leads to a contradiction.
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3 Compact representations
Since WVGs and MWVG are compact representations of coalitional voting games, it is natural to
ask which voting games can be represented by a WVG or MWVG and what is the complexity of
answering the question. Deineko and Woeginger [6] show that it is NP-hard to verify the dimension
of MWVGs. We know that every WVG is linear but not every linear game has a corresponding
WVG. Carreras and Freixas,[3] show that there exists a six-player simple linear game which cannot
be represented by a WVG. We now define problem X-Realizable as the problem to decide whether
game v can be represented by form X.
Proposition 3.1. WVG-Realizable is NP-hard for a MWVG.
Proof. This follows directly from the proof by Deineko and Woeginger [6] that it is NP-hard to
find the dimension of a MWVG.
Proposition 3.2. WVG-Realizable is in P for a simple game represented by its minimal winning,
or winning, coalitions.
This follows directly from Theorem 6 in [11]. The basic idea is that any simple game can be
represented by linear inequalities. The idea dates back at least to [16] and the complexity of this
problem was examined in the context of set covering problems. However it is one thing to know
whether a simple game is WVG-Realizable and another thing to actually represent it by a WVG.
It is not easy to represent a WVG-Realizable simple game by a WVG where all the weights are
integers as the problem transforms from linear programming to integer programming.
Proposition 3.3. (Follows from Theorem 1.7.4 of Taylor and Zwicker[11]) Any simple game is
MWVG-Realizable.
Taylor and Zwicker [24] showed that for every n ≥ 1, there is simple game of dimension n. In fact
it has been pointed out by Freixas and Puente [12] that that for every n ≥ 1, there is linear simple
game of dimension n. This shows that there is no clear relation between linearity and dimension of
simple games. However it appears exceptionally hard to actually transform a simple game (N,W )
or (N,Wm) to a corresponding MWVG. The dimension of a simple game may be exponential
(2(n/2)−1) in the number of players [24]. A simpler question is to examine the complexity of
computing, or getting a bound for, the dimension of simple games.
4 Complexity of player types
A player in a simple game may be of various types depending on its level of influence.
Definitions 4.1. For a simple game v on a set of players N , player i is a
• dummy if and only if ∀S ⊆ N , if v(S) = 1, then v(S \ {i}) = 1;
• passer if and only if ∀S ⊆ N , if i ∈ S, then v(S) = 1;
• vetoer if and only if ∀S ⊆ N , if i /∈ S, then v(S) = 0;
• dictator if and only if ∀S ⊆ N , v(S) = 1 if and only if i ∈ S.
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It is easy to see that if a dictator exists, it is unique and all other players are dummies. This
means that a dictator has voting power one, whereas all other players have zero voting power.
We examine the complexity of identifying the dummy players in voting games. We already know
that for the case of WVGs, Matsui and Matsui [19] proved that it is NP-hard to identify dummy
players.
Lemma 4.2. A player i in a simple game v is a dummy if and only if it is not present in any
minimal winning coalition.
Proof. Let us assume that player i is a dummy but is present in a minimal winning coalition. That
means that it is critical in the minimal winning coalition which leads to a contradiction. Now let
us assume that i is critical in at least one coalition S such that v(S ∪ {i}) = 1 and v(S) = 0. In
that case there is a S′ ⊂ S such that S′ ∪ {i} is a MWC.
Proposition 4.3. For a simple game v,
1. Dummy players can be identified in linear time if v is of the form (N,Wm).
2. Dummy players can be identified in polynomial time if v is of the form (N,W ).
Proof. We examine each case separately:
1. By Lemma 4.2, a player is a dummy if and only if it is not in member of Wm
2. By Lemma 2.2, Wm can be computed in polynomial time.
From the definition, we know that a player has veto power if and only if the player is present in
every winning coalition.
Proposition 4.4. Vetoers can be identified in linear time for a simple game in the following
representations: (N,W ), (N,Wm), WVG and MWVG.
Proof. We examine each of the cases separately:
1. (N,W ): Initialize all players as vetoers. For each winning coalition, if a player is not present
in the coalition, remove him from the list of vetoers.
2. (N,Wm): If there exists a winning coalition which does not contain player i, there will also
exist a minimal winning coalition which does not contain i.
3. WVG: For each player i, i has veto power if and only if w(N \ {i}) < q.
4. MWVG: For each player i, i has veto power if and only if N \ {i} is losing.
Proposition 4.5. For a simple game represented by (N,W ), (N,Wm), WVG or MWVG, it is
easy to identify the passers and the dictator.
Proof. We check both cases separately:
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1. Passers: This follows from the definition of a passer. A player i is a passer if and only if
v({i}) = 1.
2. Dictator: It is easy to see that if a dictator exists in a simple game, it is unique. It follows
from the definition of a dictator that a player i is a dictator in a simple game if v({i}) = 1
and v(N \ {i}) = 0.
5 Complexity of desirability ordering
A desirability ordering on linear games is any ordering of players such that 1 D 2 D . . . D n.
A strict desirability ordering is the following ordering on players: 1 ◦ 2 ◦ . . . ◦ n where ◦ is
either ∼D or ≻D.
Proposition 5.1. For a WVG:
1. A desirability ordering of players can be computed in polynomial time.
2. It is NP-hard to compute the strict desirability ordering of players.
Proof. WVGs are linear games with a complete desirability ordering. For (1), it is easy to see that
one desirability ordering of players in a WVG is the ordering of the weights. When wi = wj, then
we know that i ∼ j. Moreover, if wi > wj , then we know that i is at least as desirable as j, that
is i  j. For (2), the result immediately follows from the result by Matsui and Matsui [19] where
they prove that it is NP-hard to check whether two players are symmetric.
Let v be a MWVG of mWVGs on n players. It is easy to see that if there is an ordering of players
such that such that wt1 ≥ w
t
2 ≥ . . . ≥ w
t
n for all t, then v is linear. However, if an ordering like this
does not exist, this does not imply that the game is not linear. The following is an example of a
small non-linear MWVG:
Example 5.2. In game v = [10; 10, 9, 1, 0] ∧ [10; 9, 10, 0, 1], players 1 and 2 are incomparable.
So, whereas simple games with 3 players are linear, it is easy to construct a 4 player non-linear
MWVG.
Proposition 5.3. It is NP-hard to verify whether a MWVG is linear or not.
Proof. We prove this by a reduction from an instance of the classical NP-hard PARTITION prob-
lem.
Name: PARTITION
Instance: A set of k integer weights A = {a1, . . . , ak}.
Question: Is it possible to partition A, into two subsets P1 ⊆ A, P2 ⊆ A so that P1 ∩P2 = ∅ and
P1 ∪ P2 = A and
∑
ai∈P1
ai =
∑
ai∈P2
ai?
Given an instance of PARTITION {a1, . . . , ak}, we may as well assume that
∑k
i=1 ai is an even
integer, 2t say. We can transform the instance into the multiple weighted voting v = v1 ∧ v2 where
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v1 = [q; 20a1, . . . , 20ak, 10, 9, 1, 0] and v2 = [q; 20a1, . . . , 20ak, 9, 10, 0, 1] for q = 10 + 20t and k + 4
is the number of players.
If A is a ‘no’ instance of PARTITION, then we see that a subset of weights {20a1, . . . , 20ak} cannot
sum to 20t. This implies that players k+1, k+2, k+3, and k+4 are not critical for any coalition.
Since players 1, . . . , k have the same desirability ordering in both v1 and v2, v is linear.
Now let us assume that A is a ‘yes’ instance of PARTITION with a partition (P1, P2). In that
case players k + 1, k + 2, k + 3, and k + 4 are critical for certain coalitions. We see that v({k +
1} ∪ ({k + 4} ∪ P1)) = 1, v({k + 2} ∪ ({k + 4} ∪ P1)) = 0, v({k + 1} ∪ ({k + 3} ∪ P1)) = 0 and
v({k + 2} ∪ ({k + 3} ∪ P1)) = 1. Therefore, players k + 1 and k + 2 are not comparable and v is
not linear.
Proposition 5.4. For a simple game v = (N,Wm), it can be verified in O(n|Wm|) time if v is
linear or not.
Proof. Makino [17] proved that for a positive boolean function on n variables represented by the
set of all minimal true vectors minT (f), it can be checked in O(n|minT (f)|) whether the function
is regular (linear) or not. Makino’s algorithm CHECK-FCB takes minT (f) as input and outputs
‘yes’ if f is regular and ‘no’ otherwise. The proof involves encoding the minimal true vectors by a
fully condensed binary tree. Then it follows that it can be verified in O(n(|Wm|)) whether a simple
game v = (N,Wm) is linear or not.
Corollary 5.5. For a simple game v = (N,W ), it can be verified in polynomial time if v is linear
or not.
Proof. We showed earlier that (N,W ) can be transformed into (N,Wm) in polynomial time. After
that we can use Makino’s method [17] to verify whether the game is linear or not.
Muroga [20] cites Winder [26] for a result concerning comparison between boolean variables and
their incidence in prime implicants of a boolean function. Hilliard [14] points out that this result
can be used to check the desirability relation between players in WVG-Realizable simple games.
We generalize Winder’s result by proving both sides of the implications and extend Hilliard’s
observation to that of linear simple games.
Proposition 5.6. Let v = (N,Wm) be a linear simple game and let dk,i = |{S : i ∈ S, S ∈ W
m,
|S| = k}|. Then for two players i and j,
1. i ∼D j if and only if dk,i = dk,j for k = 1, . . . n.
2. i ≻D j if and only if for the smallest k where dk,i 6= dk,j, dk,i > dk,j.
Proof. 1. (⇒) Let us assume i ∼D j. Then by definition, v(S ∪ {j}) = 1⇔ v(S ∪ {i}) = 1 for
all S ⊆ N \ {i, j}. So S ∪ {i} ∈ Wm if and only if S ∪ {j} ∈ Wm. Therefore, dk,i = dk,j for
k = 1, . . . n.
(⇐) Let us assume that i ≁D j. Since v is linear, i and j are comparable. Without loss
of generality, we assume that i ≻D j. Then there exists a coalition S \ {i, j} such that
v(S ∪{i}) = 1 and v(S ∪{j}) = 0 and suppose |S| = k−1. If S∪{i} ∈Wm, then dk,i > dk,j.
If S ∪ {i} /∈Wm then there exists S′ ⊂ S such that S′ ∪ {i} ∈Wm. Thus there exists k′ < k
such that dk′,i > dk′,j.
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2. (⇒) Let us assume that i ≻D j and let k
′ be the smallest integer where dk′,i 6= dk′,j. If
dk′,i < dk′,j, then there exists a coalition S such that S ∪ {j} ∈ W
m, S ∪ {i} /∈ Wm and
|S| = k′− 1. S ∪{i} /∈Wm in only two cases. The first possibility is that v(S ∪{i}) = 0, but
this is not true since i ≻D j. The second possibility is that there exists a coalition S
′ ⊂ S
such that S′ ∪ {i} ∈ Wm. But that would mean that v(S′ ∪ {i}) = 1 and v(S′ ∪ {j}) = 0.
This also leads to a contradiction since k′ is the smallest integer where dk′,i 6= dk′,j.
(⇐) Let us assume that for the smallest k where dk,i 6= dk,j, dk,i > dk,j. This means there
exists a coalition S such that S ∪ {i} ∈ Wm, S ∪ {j} /∈ Wm and |S| = k − 1. This means
that either v(S ∪ {j}) = 0 or there exists a coalition S′ ⊂ S such that S′ ∪ {i} ∈ Wm. If
v(S∪{j}) = 0, that means i ≻D j. If there exists a coalition S
′ ⊂ S such that S′∪{j} ∈Wm,
then dk′,j > dk′,i for some k
′ < k. This leads to a contradiction.
We can use this theorem and Makino’s ‘CHECK-FCB’ algorithm [17] to make an algorithm which
takes as input a simple game (N,Wm) and returns NO if the game is not linear and returns the
strict desirability ordering otherwise.
Algorithm 1 Strict-desirability-ordering-of-simple-game
Input: Simple game v = (N,Wm) where N = {1, . . . , n} and Wm(v) = {S1, . . . , S|Wm|} .
Output: NO if v is not linear. Otherwise output desirability equivalence classes starting from
most desirable, if, v is linear.
1: X = CHECK-FCB(Wm)
2: if X = NO then
3: return NO
4: else
5: Initialize an n × n matrix D where entries di,j = 0 for all i and j in N
6: for i = 1 to |Wm| do
7: for each player x in Si do
8: d|Si|,x ← d|Si|,x + 1
9: end for
10: end for
11: return classify(N,D, 1)
12: end if
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Algorithm 2 classify
Input: set of integers classindex, n × n matrix D, integer k.
Output: subclasses.
1: if k = n+ 1 or |classindex| = 1 then
2: return classindex
3: end if
4: s← |classindex|
5: mergeSort(classindex) in descending order such that i > j if dk,i > dk,j.
6: for i = 2 to s do
7: subindex← 1; classindex.subindex ← classindex[1]
8: if dk,classindex[i] = dk,classindex[i−1] then
9: classindex.subindex ← classindex.subindex ∪ classindex[i]
10: else if dk,classindex[i] < dk,classindex[i−1] then
11: subindex← subindex+ 1
12: classindex.subindex ← {classindex[i]}
13: end if
14: end for
15: Returnset← ∅
16: A← ∅
17: for j = 1 to subindex do
18: A← classify(classindex.j,D, k + 1)
19: Returnset← A ∪ Returnset
20: end for
21: return Returnset
Proposition 5.7. The time complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(n.|Wm|+ n2log(n))
Proof. The time complexity of CHECK − FCB is O(n.|Wm|). The time complexity of com-
puting matrix D is O(Max(|Wm|, n2). For each iteration, sorting of sublists requires at most
O(nlog(n)) time. There are at most n loops. Therefore the total time complexity is O(n.|Wm|) +
O(Max(|Wm|, n2) +O(n2log(n)) = O(n.|Wm|+ n2log(n)).
Corollary 5.8. The strict desirability ordering of players in a linear simple game v = (N,W ) can
be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. The proof follows directly from the Algorithm. Moreover, we know that the set of all
winning coalitions can be transformed into a set of minimal winning coalitions in polynomial
time.
6 Power indices and Chow parameters
Apart from the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices, there are other indices which are also used.
Both the Deegan-Packel index [5] and the Holler index [15] are based on the notion of minimal win-
ning coalitions. Minimal winning coalitions are significant with respect to coalition formation [4].
The Holler index, Hi of a player i in a simple game corresponds to the Banzhaf index with one
difference: only swings in minimal winning coalitions contribute towards the Holler index.
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Definitions 6.1. We define the Holler value Mi as {S ∈W
m : i ∈ S}. The Holler index which is
called the public good index is defined by Hi(v) =
|Mi|P
j∈N |Mj |
. The Deegan Packel index for player
i in voting game v is defined by Di(v) =
1
|Wm|
∑
S∈Mi
1
|S| .
Compared to the Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index, both the Holler index and the
Deegan-Packel index do not always satisfy the monotonicity condition. In [19], Matsui and Matsui
prove that it is NP-hard to compute the Banzhaf index, Shapley-Shubik index and Deegan-Packel
index of a player. We can use a similar technique to also prove that it is NP-hard to compute the
Holler index of players in a WVG. This follows directly from the fact that it is NP-hard to decide
whether a player is dummy or not. Prasad and Kelly [21] and Deng and Papadimitriou [7] proved
that for WVGs, computing the Banzhaf values and Shapley-Shubik values is #P-parsimonious-
complete and #P-metric-complete respectively. (For details on #P-completeness and associated
reductions, see [10]). Unless specified, reductions considered with #P-completeness will be Cook
reductions (or polynomial-time Turing reductions).
What we see is that although it is NP-hard to compute the Holler index and Deegan-Packel of
players in a WVG, the Holler index and Deegan-Packel of players in a simple game represented by
its MWCs can be computed in linear time:
Proposition 6.2. For a simple game (N,Wm), the Holler index and Deegan-Packel index for all
players can be computed in linear time.
Proof. We examine each of the cases separately:
• Initialize Mi to zero. Then for each S ∈W
m, if i ∈ S, increment Mi by one.
• Initialize di to zero. Then for each S ∈W
m, if i ∈ S, increment di, by
1
|S| . Then Di =
di
|Wm| .
Proposition 6.3. For a simple game v = (N,W ), the Banzhaf index, Shapley Shubik index, Holler
index and Deegan-Packel index can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. The proof follows from the definitions. We examine each of the cases separately:
• Holler index: Transform W into Wm and then compute the Holler indices.
• Deegan-Packel: Transform W into Wm and then compute the Deegan-Packel indices.
• Banzhaf index: Initialize Banzhaf values of all players to zero. For each S ∈ W , check if
the removal of a player results in S becoming losing (not a member of W ). In that case
increment the Banzhaf value of that player by one.
• Shapley-Shubik index: Initialize Shapley values of all players to zero. For each S ∈W , check
if the removal of a player results in S becoming losing (not a member of W ). In that case
increment the Shapley value of the player by (|S| − 1)!(n − |S|)!.
The time complexity for all cases is polynomial in the order of the input.
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For a simple game (N,Wm), listing W the winning coalitions may take time exponential in the
number of players. For example, let there be only one minimal winning coalition S which contains
players 1, . . . , ⌈n/2⌉. Then the number of winning coalitions to list is exponential in the number
of players. Moreover, if |Wm| > 1, minimal winning coalitions can have common supersets. It is
shown below that for a simple game (N,Wm), even counting the total number of winning coalitions
is #P-complete. Moreover, whereas it is polynomial time easy to check if a player has zero voting
power (a dummy) or whether it has voting power 1 (dictator), it is #P-complete to find the actual
Banzhaf or Shapley-Shubik index of the player.
Proposition 6.4. For a simple game v = (N,Wm), the problem of computing the Banzhaf values
of players is #P-complete.
Proof. The problem is clearly in #P. We prove the #P-hardness of the problem by providing a
reduction from the problem of computing |W |. Ball and Provan [1] proved that computing |W |
is #P-complete. Their proof is in context of reliability functions so we first give the proof in
terms of simple games. It is known that known [22] that counting the number of vertex covers is
#P-complete (a vertex cover in a graph G = (V,E) is a subset C of V such that every edge in E
has at least one endpoint in C). Now take a simple game v = (N,Wm) where for any S ∈ Wm,
|S| = 2. Game v has a one-to-one correspondence with a graph G = (V,E) such that N = V and
{i, j} ∈ Wm if and only if {i, j} ∈ E(G). In that case the total number of losing coalitions in v
is equal to the number of vertex covers of G. Therefore the total number of winning coalitions is
equal to 2n−(number of vertex covers of G) and computing |W | is #P-complete.
Now we take a game v = (N,Wm) and convert it into another game v′ = (N ∪ {n + 1},Wm(v′))
where for each S ∈Wm(v), S ∪{n+1} ∈Wm(v′). In that case computing |W (v)| is equivalent to
computing the Banzhaf value of player n+ 1 in game v′. Therefore, computing Banzhaf values of
players in games represented by MWCs is #P-hard.
It follows from the proof that computing power of collectivity to act( |W |2n ) and Chow parameters
for a simple game (N,Wm) is #P-complete. Goldberg remarks in the conclusion of [13] that
computing the Chow parameters of a WVG is #P-complete. It is easy to prove this. The problem
of computing |W | and |Wi| for any player i is in #P since a winning coalition can be verified in
polynomial time. It is easy to reduce in polynomial time the counting version of the SUBSET-SUM
problem to counting the number of winning coalitions. Moreover, for any WVG v = [q;w1, . . . , wn],
|W (v)| is equal to |Wn+1(v
′)| where v′ is [q;w1, . . . , wn, 0]. Therefore computing |Wi| and |W | for
a WVG is #P-complete.
7 Conclusion
A summary of results has been listed in Table 1. A question mark indicates that the specified
problem is still open. It is conjectured that computing Shapley values is #P-complete and it
is NP-hard to compute Banzhaf indices for a simple game represented by (N,Wm). It is found
that although WVG, MWVG and even (N,Wm) is a relatively compact representation of simple
games, some of the important information encoded in these representations can apparently only
be accessed by unraveling these representations. There is a need for a greater examination of
transformations of simple games into compact representations.
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Table 1: Summary of results
(N,W ) (N,Wm) WVG MWVG
IDENTIFY-DUMMIES P linear NP-hard NP-hard
IDENTIFY-VETOERS linear linear linear linear
IDENTIFY-PASSERS linear linear linear linear
IDENTIFY-DICTATOR linear linear linear linear
CHOW PARAMETERS linear #P-complete #P-complete #P-complete
IS-LINEAR P P (Always linear) NP-hard
DESIRABILITY-ORDERING P P P NP-hard
STRICT-DESIRABILITY P P NP-hard NP-hard
BANZHAF-VALUES P #P-complete #P-complete #P-complete
BANZHAF-INDICES P ? NP-hard NP-hard
SHAPLEY-SHUBIK-VALUES P ? #P-complete #P-complete
SHAPLEY-SHUBIK-INDICES P ? NP-hard NP-hard
HOLLER-INDICES P linear NP-hard NP-hard
DEEGAN-PACKEL-INDICES P linear NP-hard NP-hard
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